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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effects of lobbying activities across international borders, on 
determining each country’s import tariff in a multi-principal, multi-agent, menu-auction model.  
Cross-border political donations could promote international policy cooperation because of two 
of their distinctive characteristics.  First, special interest groups use cross-border donations as 
tools to wield their influence on ruling parties of other countries directly, which promotes 
efficiency of policy formation.  Second, for ruling parties of countries, cross-border donations 
make them take into account the impact of their policy on other countries, which makes them 
more sensitive to other countries’ welfare and, therefore, more cooperative with others.  When 
ruling parties estimate the worth of political contributions from national special interest groups 
and from foreign lobbying groups with the same weight, Pareto-efficient tariffs are attained at 
which world welfare is maximized. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Foreign donations to domestic political parties are generally considered to be harmful 
to a nation’s independence.  The climate of public opinion around the world with regard to 
cross-border political contributions is gradually but continuously strengthening to the point 
that would demand the delegitimization of accepting such donations.  In fact, after the 1990’s, 
some countries, such as Canada, the Czech Republic, the Russian Federation, the U.K. and 
Singapore, revised their regulations regarding political funding in order to prohibit national 
political parties from accepting contributions from foreign sources.  In Canada, The Canada 
Elections Act was amended in 1993 to prohibit candidates and parties from receiving campaign 
contributions from abroad.  In the U.K., The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 
2000 was enacted, aiming to regulate political donations, including a ban on foreign donations.  
The prevailing opinion among these countries is that foreign campaign contributions threaten 
their right to maintain their sovereignty, determine their own laws, and elect their own officials, 
free of outside interference.1 
 These negative circumstances for foreign political donations don’t mean, however, that 
the topic is not worth considering.  Rather, it is possible they could promote international 
policy cooperation in two ways.  First, if the donors of political contributions are permitted to 
give donations to foreign countries, they could use their donations as tools to wield their 
influence on ruling parties of countries directly, which would promote efficiency of policy 
formation.  Second, the ruling parties of countries, recipients of political contributions, would 
take into account the impact of their policy on other countries, which would make them more 
sensitive to other countries’ welfare and, therefore, more cooperative with others.  I explain 
these two benefits of cross-border political donations in this paper, taking import tariffs as an 
example.  When ruling parties estimate the worth of political contributions from national 
special interest groups and from foreign lobbying groups with the same weight, Pareto-efficient 
tariffs are attained at which world welfare is maximized.  This result implies that cross-border 
political contributions per se are not harmful for the formation of cooperative economic policies. 
My economic analysis of political donations from abroad is inspired by two 
observations.  First, two papers presented figures that show that foreign lobbying had a 
significant impact on the trade policy of the U.S.  The pioneering work of Gawande, Krishna, 
and Robbins (2004) empirically demonstrated that in the years 1978 - 82, the presence of an 
organized non-U.S. lobby representing a particular industrial sector had as much effect on 
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lowering tariffs against imports in that sector as did the presence of a U.S. lobby in raising 
tariffs there.  Kee, Olarreaga, and Silva (2004) also showed that lobbying expenditures in the 
U.S. by Latin American exporters are a significant determinant of tariff preferences granted by 
the U.S. in the years 1997 - 2000.2  Seeing the positive effect of foreign lobbying activity on U.S. 
trade policy, it is natural to extend it to consider the case of “multilateral lobbying,” that is, the 
combined case of domestic lobbying activities and two-way cross-border lobbying activities both 
from the home country to the foreign and from the foreign country to the home. 
A second observation is that some scholars of international law found positive aspects 
of foreign donations in their research.  Damrosch (1989) concludes that nonforcible political 
influence, including political funding which comes from foreign sources, has the potential both 
for enhancing internationally protected human rights and for promoting constructive, 
nonviolent relations between states, with the condition that it doesn’t prevent the people of 
another state from exercising their political rights and freedoms.  As for research focusing 
more on the economic aspect, Powell (1996) asserts that foreign corporations have a legitimate 
right to express their interests in some manner, since they have a significant interest in the 
domestic policies of other countries.  He argues that the international community should 
direct its attention to attacking international bribery, instead of instituting blanket 
prohibitions against all types of foreign campaign contributions.  My research complements 
these arguments from the point of view of economics, showing that foreign donations would 
make trade policies more cooperative internationally. 
 It is curious to see that the significance of foreign donations to domestic political 
parties has almost been neglected as a subject of economic research until recently, with the 
exception of Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Hamada (1993).  Grossman and Helpman 
(1995) analyze in their appendix the conditions under which a free trade agreement could be 
concluded by two small countries in the case when politicians were permitted to accept 
donations from abroad.  They found that the conditions in the case permitting cross-border 
donations could be more or less stringent than the conditions in the case prohibiting them, 
depending on the circumstances.  Hamada (1993) considers the situation where one home 
lobby gave a political contribution in order that its home government would protect its profit, 
while one foreign lobby also donated to the home government in order to pressure it for free 
trade.  In his setting, permitting a foreign donation would increase the national welfare of the 
home country.  My paper extends Hamada (1993) in order to consider the effect of two-way 
lobbying across borders on import tariffs of two large countries in a general way by employing 
the theoretical foundation of Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
Readers might consider my research target to be exceptional cases if we assume that 
the ban on accepting political donations from abroad is dominant in the world.  In fact, 
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political funding laws differ from country to country in their approach to foreign contributions.  
It is true that some large countries, the United States (U.S.), Canada, the United Kingdom 
(U.K.), France, and Japan, for example, have laws against foreign donations.  There are, 
however, other countries that tolerate such donations explicitly or implicitly.  Germany, the 
Scandinavian countries, Australia, and New Zealand, for example, permit their national parties 
to accept donations from abroad.  Switzerland and Austria, proud of their permanent 
neutrality, admit foreign donations.  According to Austin and Tjernström (2003), among 111 
countries which are categorized as “free” and “partly free” concerning political rights and civil 
liberties in the 2002 Freedom House Index, and whose data are reported, only about one third 
(40 countries) have regulations totally banning political donations from foreign sources. 
Table 1 classifies the number of countries which totally ban foreign donations by 
income and by region, reported in Austin and Tjernström (2003).  This table shows that 
national income and per capita income of a country have little to do with whether that country 
admits or bans political donations from abroad.  As for income, high national income countries 
and high per capita income countries don’t necessarily totally ban political donations from 
abroad.  Among 29 countries whose national GDP is more than 100,000 million US$, fewer 
than half totally ban foreign donations, and among 28 countries whose GDP per capita is more 
than 10,000 US$, only about two fifths do.  As for regions, each of them has a significant 
number of countries which permit national parties to accept foreign contributions.  Countries 
which tolerate foreign donations are neither exceptions nor symbols of underdevelopment.  
They are dispersed throughout the globe. 
Previous achievements in economics provide us with tools to analyze this problem.  I 
employ the notion of truthful strategy introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986).  With the 
multi-principal, one-agent and first-price menu-auction model, under the assumption of 
complete information, they show that a truthful Nash equilibrium is always efficient and stable.  
Grossman and Helpman (1994) apply this equilibrium concept in a model of endogenous policy 
determination.  Their reformulation of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) provides us a tractable 
way of thinking about the influence of lobbies on their government’s policy decisions.  The 
theoretical analysis of “multilateral lobbying” needs truthful strategy in a multi-principal 
multi-agent model, which was first proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1996) in a certain 
environment, and later by Prat and Rustichini (2003) in a more general case.  The concept of 
weakly truthful equilibrium by Prat and Rustichini (2003) preserves the desirable 
characteristic of efficiency, which my results rely on.  Although they don’t consider strategic 
interdependency between agents, my model shows that, under certain circumstances, the 
efficient equilibrium is attained even under the existence of strategic relationships. 
Various papers have investigated how to establish efficient trade policies and ensure 
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freer trade, given the absence of a supra-national authority to enforce the terms of agreements 
concerning tariffs.  Previous research is mainly divided into two groups.  The first one 
examined the role of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to promote self-enforcing efficient tariff regimes.  Dixit (1987), Bagwell 
and Staiger (1990), Riezman (1991), Maggi (1999) and Ederington (2001) treat GATT/WTO as a 
forum for repeating negotiation with the threat to retaliate for violation.  Bagwell and Staiger 
(1999) evaluate the reciprocity principle of the GATT and find that it can assist governments in 
achieving efficient policy outcomes by eliminating the terms-of-trade effect of protection. 
The second group looked at the noninstitutional interdependency of decision-making 
between economic activities as a tool to decrease tariffs endogenously.  Devereux and Lee 
(1999) examine the interaction between international financial markets and trade policy, and 
find that free trade tends toward equilibrium when international financial markets are fully 
diversified.  Krishna and Mitra (2005) discuss the idea that unilateral tariff reduction by a 
large country can induce a trading counterpart to reduce its tariff in return, with the model of 
endogenous lobby formation.  Blanchard (2005) shows that export-platform foreign direct 
investment (FDI) induces unilateral tariff liberalization by the FDI-source country, suggesting 
that international capital mobility may substitute for multilateral trade liberalization.  Limão 
(2005) analyses the linkage of retaliation between trade policy and environmental policy, and 
shows that if they are strategic complements then policy linkage can sustain more cooperation 
in both issues than no-linkage.  This paper belongs to this group; I propose “multilateral 
lobbying” as a new tool to attain Pareto-efficient tariffs.  Using multilateral lobbying the 
conditions for Pareto-efficiency are clear and simple. 
 The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the basic economic 
structure of two countries involved in trade with each other.  Section 3 considers domestic 
lobbying activities by national special interest groups, which propose their schedule of 
donations to the national ruling party.  Section 4 takes cross-border lobbying activities into 
account additionally in the model.  Section 5 examines the conditions in which the permission 
of both kinds of lobbying leads the economy to Pareto-efficiency and the sum of the two 
countries’ welfare is maximized.  Section 6 extends the model to the case of nonpecuniary 
negative externality.  Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and presents policy implication.   
 
2. The Model 
 
Consider a two-country multi-good general equilibrium model of trade.  Two countries, 
home (no *) and foreign (*), produce and trade competitively N+1 goods.3  Good 0 is a 
numeraire good, which is traded freely across countries and serves to settle the balance of trade.  
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Numeraire good 0 is produced by labor alone, with constant returns to scale.  I choose units so 
that a world and domestic price of good 0 is equal to one.  It is assumed that aggregate labor 
supply, L , is large enough to sustain a positive output of good 0.  This implies that wage rates 
in numeraire terms are equalized to one across countries. 
Each of the non-numeraire goods i = 1, 2, …, N is produced by labor and a 
sector-specific input, with constant returns to scale.  Specific inputs are available in inelastic 
supply.  Ruling parties (RPs) in the home and foreign countries use a vector of specific import 
tariffs ( )Nτττ ,,1 K=  as a policy instrument.  The local price of good i in terms of the 
numeraire good 0 is thus given by iiwi pp τ+= , where iwp  is the world price4.  With a wage 
rate equal to one, the total rent iR  accruing to the specific factor in sector i depends only on 
the local price of the good, and thus can be expressed as ( )ii pR .  Industry supply is then given 
by ( ) iiii pRpY ∂∂= . 
The country is populated by a number of H individuals, who have identical preferences 
with their utility functions taking the following form: 
(1) ( ) ( )∑
=
+≡
N
i
iiN cuccccu
1
010 ,...,, , 
where 0c  and ic  are the consumption of numeraire good 0 and non-numeraire good i, 
respectively.  ( )ii cu  is assumed to be twice differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. 
 Provided that income always exceeds expenditure on the nonnumeraire goods, the 
domestic demand for good i can be expressed as a function of local price alone, i.e., ( )ii pD .  
Net import demand is then ( ) ( ) ( )iiiiii pYpDpM −= .  The world untaxed price, iwp , is 
determined by the market-clearing condition: 
(2) ( ) ( ) 0,, ** =+ iwiiiwii pMpM ττ . 
From Equation (2), we can derive an expression for world equilibrium prices as a function of the 
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policies in the two countries, i.e., ( )*, iiiwp ττ . 
 Domestic welfare is defined as the total amount of labor income, rent, tariff revenue, 
and consumer surplus.5 
(3) ( )*,ττW ( ) ( )∑∑
==
++≡
N
i
iiii
N
i
iii MRL
1
*
1
* ,, τττττ ( )( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+ ∑∑
==
H
i
iiii
H
i
iiii cpcuH
1
*
1
* ,, ττττ . 
The RP in each country sets its import tariff as a policy instrument in order to 
maximize its objective function.  In the case in which the RP doesn’t accept any donations, it is 
assumed to try to maximize its domestic welfare in order to enhance political support from the 
domestic electorate and ensure that it will stay in power after the next election.  Therefore, the 
objective function of RP, NG  (N to the upper right denotes “no donations”), is described as 
( ) ( )** ,; ττττ WGN ≡ .6  
When each RP sets its tariff unilaterally to maximize its domestic welfare, taking the 
tariff of the other country as given, the first-order conditions for maximization of the RP’s 
objective function is defined by 
(4) ( ) 01 =−
∂
∂
+≡≡ i
i
i
iii
N
p
M
MWG
ii
φτφττ , 
where iiwi p τφ ∂∂≡− , 10 << iφ .  NiGτ  and iWτ  represent the partial derivative of the RP’s 
objective function ( NG ) and domestic welfare (W ) with respect to the tariff on good i ( iτ ), 
respectively.  From Equations (2) and (4), the reaction function of iτ  can be expressed as 
(5) ( ) ( ) *
*
*
1 Mi
i
i
M
i
ii
i
N
i
pp
εφε
φ
ττ =
−
−= , 
where ( )( )iiiiMi MppM ∂∂≡ε  and ≡*Miε ( )** ii pM ∂∂ ( )** ii Mp  are the home and foreign 
price elasticities of import demand or export supply, depending on whether iM  is positive or 
negative.  Equation (5) is a familiar expression of optimal tariff, coming from the monopoly 
power to change the terms of trade.  When the home country is the exporter of good i, for 
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example, 0>Miε  and 0
* <Miε , then 0<
N
iτ , which means the home country levies positive 
tax on the export of good i.  The changes of iτ  and 
*
iτ  under the condition of satisfying 
Equation (5) is denoted by ( )
Rii
dd *ττ , and the case ( ) 0* >
Rii
dd ττ  is considered 
hereinafter.  Also, I assume a set of Equation (5) and the corresponding equation for the other 
country has a unique and stable equilibrium. 
 
3. Domestic Lobbying 
 
 In this section, I examine the situation in which the RP accepts political contributions 
from domestic special interest groups (SIGs) only.  The country has K domestic SIGs which are 
formed by its people.  The welfare of j-th SIG is ( )*,ττjW , j = 1, 2, …, K.  Neither the 
preference of each SIG for tariffs nor the number of constituent members of it matters.  There 
are two critical assumptions about SIGs which I accept hereinafter.  First, SIGs are well 
organized in both countries, and all the individuals belong to just one of the domestic SIGs, that 
is, jjWW Σ= .7  Second, 
jW  is assumed to be twice differentiable, increasing, and strictly 
concave.  These assumptions assure 
(6) ∑
=
=
K
j
j
ii
WW
1
ττ , ∑
=
=
K
j
j
ii
WW
1
** ττ
. 
Each SIG decides its amount of donation to the national RP, which is in the position to 
set policy, in order to maximize SIG’s welfare.  The SIGs are assumed not to contribute to any 
opposition parties.  The RP, on the other hand, chooses τ  to maximize a weighted sum of 
donations from national SIGs and net aggregate national welfare after deducting donations, 
with *τ  as given.  This decision-making process is analyzed as the following two-stage game.  
First, each SIG chooses its own bilateral contract schedule, which is publicly observable, 
simultaneously and noncooperatively.  j-SIG in the home country offers a schedule of tariff 
vector, τ , and the amount of donation, DjC , to the RP (D to the upper right denotes “domestic 
donations”).  The contract schedule can be rewritten as ( )( )τττ *,DjC ( )τDjC= , since each SIG 
predicts correctly how the shift of our τ  causes the other country to change *τ , based on the 
corresponding Equation (5) for the other country.  Second, each RP decides whether to accept 
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or reject the SIGs’ offers, and then chooses τ  (for the RP in the home country) or *τ  (in the 
foreign country), simultaneously and noncooperatively.  RP’s objective function under the 
circumstance of existing contribution from domestic SIGs, ( )*;ττDG , is 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−≡ ∑
=
K
j
DjD CWG
1
** ,1; ττταττ ( )∑
=
+
K
j
DjC
1
τα , 
assuming 121 ≤< α  in order that the RP values campaign contributions positively and, 
therefore, accepts them. 
I solve this two-stage game backwards.  At the second stage, the RP decides τ  to 
maximize its objective function.  Differentiation of Equation (7) with iτ  creates the following 
first-order condition for maximization of objective function for the RP. 
(8) ( ) ( ) 0211
1
=−−−≡ ∑
=
K
j
DjD
iii
CWG τττ αα . 
Next, at the first stage, SIGs choose contract offers.  To calculate the equilibrium of 
contracts, I employ the idea of “truthful” equilibrium in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), which 
is applied to a model of endogenous policy determination by Grossman and Helpman (1994).  
Truthful equilibrium needs to be jointly efficient for SIGs and the RP.  Joint efficiency means 
that DG  is maximized, subject to constraints on the levels of each SIG’s welfare anchor, jW .  
In equilibrium, the following equation is satisfied concerning the contract schedule of j-SIG.8 
(9) ( ) ( ) jjDj WWC −= *,τττ . 
Each SIG decides the menu of monetary contribution to the national RP and the 
request of its tariff vector under the constraint of Equation (9).  That is, in truthful 
equilibrium of contract offers, the following condition is satisfied for each SIG. 
(10) 
*
*
*
Ri
ijjDj
d
d
WWC
iii τ
τ
τττ
+= . 
This equation means that, in the first stage, each SIG correctly predicts the reaction of the 
other country’s tariff ( ( )
*
*
Rii
dd ττ ) and takes it into consideration when it proposes its 
schedule of donation.9  Substitute Equation (10) into Equation (8) and use Equations (2) and 
(6), and the first-order condition for maximization of objective function for the RP is expressed 
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as Equation (11). 
(11) 0
*
*
* =+
Ri
i
d
d
WW
ii τ
τϕ
ττ
, 
where ( ) ** iiiii pMMW
i
φτ
τ
∂∂−=  and ( ) ααϕ 12 −= .  Equation (11) defines reaction 
functions ( )αττ ,*iDi  for the case when the RP accept political donations from national SIGs as 
follows: 
(12) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )( )iiiiMi
iii
ii
M
i
iii
i
D
i
pp
φπφφε
πφ
πφε
πφ
αττ
−−
+
=
−−
+
−=
11
, *
*
* , 
where ( ) 0
*
** >=
Riiii
dd ττϕφπ , and ii φπ −< 1 .10   
From the comparison of Equation (12) with (5), we see ( ) ( )αττττ ,0 ** iDiiNi <<  when 
the country is an importer of good i and levies a positive import tariff on it ( 0<Miε ), while 
( ) ( ) 0, ** << iNiiDi τταττ  when the country is an exporter of good i and imposes a positive export 
tariff on it ( 0>Miε ), at any 
*
iτ  and α .  This shows that the RP enhances trade barriers 
when it accepts political contributions from national SIGs.  The rationale behind this 
relationship is that the welfare of the country increases when the other country decreases its 
trade barriers ( 0* <
i
W
τ
 in the case that the country is the exporter of good i, and 0* >
i
W
τ
 in 
the case that the country is its importer), and national SIGs can make the RP in the other 
country decrease its trade barriers by demanding that the domestic RP increase its trade 
barriers ( ( ) 0
*
* >
Rii
dd ττ ) by means of political donations.  We also see from Equation (12) the 
monotonous relationship between Diτ  and α : 0>∂∂ ατ Di  when the country levies a 
positive import tariff on good i ( 0<Miε ), while 0<∂∂ ατ Di  when the country imposes a 
positive export tariff on it ( 0>Miε ).  This shows that when the RP highly values domestic 
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donations, its trade barriers increases.  These discussions are summarized in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1.  When an RP is permitted to accept political donations from national 
SIGs, an RP increases its import/export tariffs.  The more an RP evaluates domestic donations, 
the more the country’s tariffs increase. 
From Equation (11), when 1=α  in the home country and 21* ≤α  in the foreign 
country (in the case in which a foreign RP doesn’t receive domestic donations), the intersection 
point of reaction functions ( )αττ ,*iDi  and ( )** ,αττ iDi  satisfies the condition 
( ) ( ) ** * Rii ddWW ii ττττ =− .  This is a Stackleberg equilibrium in which the home country is the 
leader and foreign country is the follower.  This implies that when the foreign country doesn’t 
permit domestic lobbying activities, the home country is better off permitting domestic lobbying 
and moving equilibrium toward a Stackleberg equilibrium.  Under the restriction of 
121 ≤< α  and 121 * ≤< α , however, a new equilibrium in the case of existing domestic 
lobbying in both countries can be the point at which both countries are worse off. 
 
4. Multilateral Lobbying 
 
 This section considers the case of multilateral lobbying, in which each SIG is permitted 
to give its donation across the border, and each RP accepts donations both from domestic and 
foreign SIGs.  j-SIG chooses publicly observable bilateral contract offers ( )τDjC  to the home 
RP (domestic lobbying) and ( )( )** ,τττjCC ( )*τjCC=  to the foreign RP (cross-border lobbying).  
Similarly, j*-SIG chooses ( )*** τjDC  to the foreign RP and ( )( ) ( )ττττ ***** , jCjC CC =  to the 
home RP.  The RP’s objective function for the home (foreign) country in the case of multilateral 
lobbying is ( )*;ττMG  ( ( )ττ ,**MG ) (M to the upper right represents “multilateral lobbying”), 
which is composed of national welfare W  ( *W ), domestic donations DjjCΣ  (
**
*
jD
j CΣ ), and 
cross-border donations ***
jC
j CΣ  (
jC
jCΣ ). 
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Policymakers’ objective functions in the home country, ( )*;ττMG , and those in the 
foreign country, ( )ττ ;**MG , are, respectively, 
(13a) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−−≡ ∑∑
==
K
j
jC
K
j
DjM CCWG
1
*
1
** ,1; ττττβαττ  
( )∑
=
+
K
j
DjC
1
τα ( )∑
=
+
*
1*
**
K
j
jCC τβ , 
(13b) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−−≡ ∑∑
==
*
1*
**
*
1*
********* ,1;
K
j
jC
K
j
jDM CCWG ττττβαττ  
( )∑
=
+
*
1*
****
K
j
jDC τα ( )∑
=
+
K
j
jCC
1
** τβ , 
where 10 << β , 10 * << β , αβα 21 ≤−≤ , and *** 21 αβα ≤−≤ .  These restrictions 
assure that all the donations to the home RP ( DjC  and ** jCC ) and those to the foreign RP 
( ** jDC  and jCC ) have positive weights in ( )*;ττMG  and ( )ττ ;**MG .  The RP of the home 
(foreign) country chooses iτ  (
*
iτ ) to maximize Equation (13a) (Equation (13b)), with 
*
iτ  ( iτ ) 
considered to be given. 
I solve this problem backwards, in the same way as the domestic lobbying case.  At 
the second stage, the home RP and the foreign RP decide iτ  and 
*
iτ , respectively, to maximize 
their objective functions.  Differentiation of Equation (13a) with iτ  and that of Equation 
(13b) with *iτ  create the first-order conditions for maximization of objective functions for the 
home RP as Equation (14a) and for the foreign RP as Equation (14b), respectively. 
(14a) ( ) ( )∑
=
−−−−−≡
K
j
DjM
iii
CWG
1
211 τττ βαβα 0
*
1*
**
=+ ∑
=
K
j
jC
i
Cτβ , 
 12
(14b) ( ) ( )∑
=
−−−−−≡
*
1
********
*** 211
K
j
jDM
iii
CWG
τττ
βαβα 0
1
*
* =+ ∑
=
K
j
jC
i
C
τ
β . 
Next, at the first stage, each SIG chooses its schedule of donations.  As in the previous 
section, I focus on truthful equilibrium, where all lobbies make a positive contribution.  In 
other words, in equilibrium, the following equations are satisfied. 
(15a) ( ) ( ) ( ) jjjCDj WWCC −=+ ** ,ττττ , 
(15b) ( ) ( ) ( ) ********** , jjjCjD WWCC −=+ ττττ . 
These conditions are the same as the definition of weakly truthful transfers by Prat and 
Rustichini (2003).  Each SIG decides its contribution schedules to both home and foreign RPs 
under the constraint of Equation (15a) or (15b).  That is, in a truthful equilibrium of contract 
offers, the following conditions are satisfied for SIGs. 
(16a) 
*
*
*
*
**
Ri
ijj
Ri
ijCDj
d
d
WW
d
d
CC
iiii τ
τ
τ
τ
ττττ
+=+ , j
Ri
ijjC
Ri
iDj
iiii
W
d
d
WC
d
d
C ** ** ττττ τ
τ
τ
τ
+=+ , 
(16a) 
Ri
ijj
Ri
ijCjD
d
d
WW
d
d
CC
iiii *
****
*
****
**
τ
τ
τ
τ
ττττ
+=+ , **
*
****
*
**
*
*
*
*
j
Ri
ijjC
Ri
ijD
iiii
W
d
d
WC
d
d
C ττττ τ
τ
τ
τ
+=+ . 
Solving Equations (16a) and (16b) produces the following equations. 
(17a) jDj
ii
WC ττ = , 
jjC
ii
WC ** ττ = ,  (17b) 
**** jjD
ii
WC ττ = , 
***
**
jjC
ii
WC
ττ
= ,. 
That is, when SIGs design their donation schedules to home and foreign RPs, all they need to 
take into consideration is the direct effect of home and foreign tariffs on their welfare.  
Strategic relationships between countries have no role to play in the case of multilateral 
lobbying, because such an indirect effect is properly replaced by a direct effect.  In the absence 
of contributions from home SIGs to the foreign RP, any rise in the home export/import tariffs 
leads to a fall in the foreign import/export tariffs, which strategic effect home SIGs take into 
consideration when they decide their donations schedules.  This indirect way to change the 
foreign tariff is, however, not efficient.  By contributing to the foreign RP directly, this strategic 
effect is eliminated in equilibrium so that only the direct effect remains, which promotes 
efficiency of policy formation in the home country.  This is the first benefit of cross-border 
political donations.  The same arguments apply for the foreign country, and this result can be 
rewritten as the following proposition. 
 Proposition 2.  When both domestic and cross-border lobbying activities are permitted, 
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the schedules of donation presented by a SIG to a home RP and a foreign RP are determined by 
the direct effect of home tariffs and foreign tariffs, respectively, on the SIG’s welfare. 
Substitute Equations (17a) and (17b) into (14a) and (14b), then 
(18a) 0* =+
ii
WW ττ ω ,  (18b) 0**
**
=+
ii
WW
ττ
ω , 
where αβω =  and *** αβω = .  These equations show that, in the case of multilateral 
lobbying, the RP takes into account the impact of its trade policy on the welfare of the other 
country through cross-border donations, which makes the RP more cooperative with the other 
country.  This is the second benefit of cross-border political donations.  Equations (18a) and 
(18b) define reaction functions ( )ωττ ,*iMi  for the home country and ( )** ,ωττ iMi  for the 
foreign country, respectively, for the case in which the RP accepts political donations from both 
national SIGs and the other country’s SIGs, which are written as follows: 
(19a) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) **
*
** 1
1
1, iM
i
i
i
i
M
i
ii
i
M
i
pp
ωτ
ε
ωωτφε
φ
ωωττ +−=+
−
−= , 
(19b) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) iMi
i
i
i
M
i
ii
i
M
i
pp
τω
ε
ωτωφε
φ
ωωττ *****
**
*** 1
1
1, +−=+
−
−= . 
From the comparison of Equations (19a) with (5), we see ( ) ( )** , iNiiMi ττωττ <  when the 
home country is an importer of good i ( 0<Miε ), while ( ) ( )ωττττ ,** iMiiNi <  when the country is 
an exporter of it ( 0>Miε ), at any 
*
iτ  and ω .  This shows that the RP reduces trade barriers 
in the case of multilateral lobbying, due to the two benefits of cross-border lobbying mentioned 
above.  We also see again from Equation (19a) the monotonous relationship between Miτ  and 
β : 0<∂∂ βτ Mi  when the country imports good i, while 0>∂∂ βτ Mi  when the country 
exports it.  This shows that when the RP highly values cross-border donations, its trade 
barriers decreases.  In the case of multilateral lobbying, the strategic relationships between 
tariffs in two countries disappear, and the RP only counts the direct effect of its trade policy on 
the welfare of both countries.  The reduction of trade barriers (export and import tariffs) in a 
country is beneficial for the other country, and the more highly the RP values political 
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donations from abroad, the more the RP lowers its trade barriers for the foreign country.  From 
Equations (19a) and (19b) I derived the third proposition. 
Proposition 3.  When an RP accepts both domestic and cross-border donations, that 
RP decreases its import/export tariffs.  The more highly an RP values cross-border donations 
compared with domestic donations, the more the country’s tariffs decrease. 
Comparing this condition with the case of no donations as in Section 2, the shift of 
tariff reaction curves after admitting only domestic lobbying is in the opposite direction from 
the shift of those after admitting multilateral lobbying.  This results from the differences 
between the SIG’s and RP’s behavior in two cases.  Consider the relationship between the 
donations schedules of SIGs and other country’s tariffs first.  In both cases, the home country’s 
welfare increases when the foreign country lessens its export/import tariffs.  In order to have 
the foreign RP decrease its trade barriers, in the case of domestic donations, home SIGs request 
the home RP to increase its own export/import tariffs by means of domestic donations, which 
leads the shift of reaction curves of home tariffs to the direction of enhancing trade barriers.  
This is an indirect way of decreasing the other country’s trade taxes, by employing the strategic 
relationships between trade policies.  In the case of multilateral lobbying, however, home SIGs 
can use a direct way; they directly request the foreign RP to decrease its trade barriers by 
means of cross-border donations.  The reaction curves of home tariffs, therefore, don’t change.  
Second, as for RPs’ objective functions, RPs don’t consider the welfare of the other country in 
the case of domestic lobbying, and so the reaction curves of home tariffs don’t depend on it.  In 
the case of multilateral lobbying, however, the home RP needs to take care of the other country’s 
welfare, because it receives cross-border donations from foreign SIGs.  The reaction curves of 
home tariffs, therefore, shift to the direction of lowering trade barriers.11 
 
5. Efficient Policies 
 
Multilateral lobbying moves the trade policy of two countries toward a Pareto-efficient 
pair of tariffs.  It doesn’t guarantee, however, that a new equilibrium locates on 
Pareto-efficiency locus.  In this section, I examine closely the condition for multilateral 
lobbying to yield Pareto efficiency and to maximize the weighted sum of two countries’ welfare. 
A Pareto-efficiency locus is defined as the set of a pair of tariff vectors which satisfies 
the following condition. 
(20) 
0*
*
0
*
==
=
dWi
i
dWi
i
d
d
d
d
τ
τ
τ
τ
. 
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( )PEPE *,ττ  are the tariff vectors which satisfy Equation (20), and are called “efficient tariffs.”  
The pair of efficient tariffs is achieved under the condition 1* =ωω , which is verified as 
follows: 0=dW  and 0* =dW  require the conditions, respectively, 
(21a) *
*
i
i
d
d
W
W
i
i
τ
τ
τ
τ
=− ,  (21b) **
*
*
i
i
d
d
W
W
i
i
τ
τ
τ
τ
=− . 
Under the equilibrium of multilateral lobbying, both Equations (18a) and (18b) are satisfied, so 
if we substitute Equation (18b) into Equation (21a) and Equation (18a) into Equation (21b), we 
find that Equation (20) is satisfied for all goods when 1* =ωω .  Next, substitute 1* =ωω  
into Equation (18b), and we obtain 0*** =+
ii
WW
ττ
ω .  This equation and Equation (18a) are 
considered to be the first-order conditions for maximization of the weighted sum of home and 
foreign welfare, where ω  is a weight for foreign welfare.  From these arguments, I obtain the 
next proposition. 
Proposition 4.  ( )PEPE *,ττ  attains equilibrium in the case of multilateral lobbying 
when 1* =ωω .  ( )PEPE *,ττ  maximizes the weighted sum of home and foreign welfare, where 
ω  is a weight for foreign welfare. 
It is directly derived from Proposition 4 that the condition which maximizes the 
unweighted sum of home and foreign welfare, i.e., world welfare, is ( )*,ωω ( )1,1= .  This 
means that when each RP evaluates domestic and cross-border donations with the same weight 
( βα =  and ** βα = ) potential benefit from multilateral lobbying is maximized.  The 
following is a straightforward corollary of Proposition 4. 
Corollary.  World welfare is maximized when each RP makes no distinction between 
domestic and cross-border donations. 
 Solving Equations (19a) and (19b) with the condition ( )*,ωω ( )1,1=  yields the result 
0* =− ii ττ .  This condition implies that two countries set the net trade barriers of good i at 
zero so as not to distort trade flows, and then the local prices of good i are equal to each other.  
0* =− ii ττ  does not guarantee, however, that both countries increase their welfare by 
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multilateral lobbying, even when 0* == ii ττ .  In order to assure that both countries are 
better off, we need the introduction of a system of international income redistribution.  One 
implication of this theoretical fact is that, in order to extract the full potential benefit from 
multilateral lobbying, it is necessary not only to have each RP evaluate domestic and 
cross-border donations with the same weight but also to establish some sort of international 
institution which handles negotiations about international income transfer and its effective 
execution.  It may require arduous negotiation to reach an agreement among nations to 
establish such an institution and to launch an effective and powerful scheme of international 
income transfer, beneficial for all participants.  The institution is, however, essential in 
distributing the benefit of international policy coordination brought about through multilateral 
lobbying to all nations.12 
 
6. Extension: International Trade with Negative Externality 
 
The model developed in the text doesn’t deal with the external effect.  Externality 
does not, however, change the propositions mentioned above if welfare functions preserve 
concavity.  This section illustrates this statement by introducing externality negative to 
welfare into the model, along the lines of Ederington (2001), Conconi (2003), and Limão (2005).  
They studied trade and domestic policies in large open countries with the presence of negative 
externalities arising from their production.  In this section I examine the determination of 
policies with the existence of negative externality, first in the context that there are only trade 
policies, and second in the context that there are both trade and domestic policies. 
 
6.1. The case of one policy tool: tariff 
 
 I slightly modify the model setting presented in Section 2; the productions of 
non-numeraire goods are assumed to be accompanied by international negative externalities as 
by-products in both countries.  This decreases the welfare of individuals in both countries in a 
nonpecuniary manner.  I examine hereinafter the determination of ( )*, ii ττ  in the cases of 
no-lobbying and of cross-lobbying. 
The utility function of individuals (Equation (1)) is modified to the following form: 
(22) ( ) ( ) ZcucZcccu N
i
iiN −+≡ ∑
=1
010 ,,...,, , 
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where Z  is total externalities to the country from the productions of non-numeraire goods.  
The degree of Z  is a function of the outputs in both home and foreign countries as follows: 
(23) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]∑
=
+≡
N
i
iiiiiciiiiid pYpYZ
1
***** ,,, ττηττηττ , 
where 0≥idη  is the parameter of externality which represents the extent to which domestic 
production of good i decreases the utility of individuals.  0≥icη  is the parameter of 
cross-border externality from the production of good i in the other country.  Equation (23) is 
the same as Conconi (2003).  If =icη 0* =icη , then there is no cross-border externality 
concerning the production of good i, which case Ederington (2001) considered.  If =icη 0≠idη  
and =*icη 0* ≠idη , then the externalities from two countries are completely indifferent for the 
home and the foreign, respectively.13 
 Domestic welfare is redefined as the total amount of labor income, rent, tariff revenue, 
consumer surplus, plus the negative effect of externalities. 
(24) ( )*,ττW ( ) ( )∑∑
==
++≡
N
i
iiii
N
i
iii MRL
1
*
1
* ,, τττττ ( )( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+ ∑∑
==
H
i
iiii
H
i
iiii cpcuH
1
*
1
* ,, ττττ  
( )*,ττHZ− . 
When the RP sets its tariff unilaterally to maximize its domestic welfare, taking the 
tariff of the other country as given, the resulting reaction function of tariff on good i is defined 
by 
(25) **
*
*
*
M
ii
Y
iic
M
ii
Y
iid
M
i
i
i m
H
m
Hp
ε
εη
ε
εη
ε
τ −+= , 
where ( )( ) 0>∂∂≡ iiiiYi YppYε , ( )( ) 0***** >∂∂≡ iiiiYi YppYε , iii YMm ≡ , and 
***
iii YMm ≡ .  Compared with Equation (5), Equation (25) has two additional terms: 
M
ii
Y
iid mH εεη  and *** MiiYiic mH εεη .  MiiYiid mH εεη  represents the welfare effect of 
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externalities from the local production of good i, which varies according to the local price of good 
i.  0<Mii
Y
iid mH εεη  always holds, which means that the increase of iτ  strengthens the 
negative externality on local welfare through the increase of the local price of good i and, 
therefore, the production of it.14  *** Mii
Y
iic mH εεη  represents, on the other hand, the welfare 
effect of externalities from the foreign production of good i.  0*** >− Mii
Y
iic mH εεη  always 
holds, which means that the increase of iτ  lessens the negative externality, through the 
decrease of the foreign price of good i, which decreases in turn the foreign production of good i.  
The reaction function of iτ , determined from Equation (25), might be higher or lower than that 
from Equation (5), depending on the relative strengths of these two terms. 
 In the case of multilateral lobbying with ( )*,ωω ( )1,1= , the reaction functions of 
tariffs on good i in the home and foreign countries are expressed as15 
(26) 
( )
0
**
<
+
= M
ii
Y
iicid
i m
HH
ε
εηη
τ . 
Equation (26) shows that the level of iτ  is determined by the effect of iτ  on negative 
externality caused from the domestic production of good i to the welfare of the home country, 
M
ii
Y
iid mH εεη , and by the effect on externality to the welfare of the foreign country, 
M
ii
Y
iic mH εεη* .  This form represents the fact that optimal assignment for trade policy in a 
country, with the existence of negative externality, exists to redress its own externality.  
Equation (26) doesn’t include the term of optimal tariff.  The monopoly power of countries is 
eliminated completely in order to maximize world welfare.  
 
6.2. The case of two policy tools: tariff and production tax 
 
 The previous part considers tariffs of two countries as a single policy tool.  The 
theoretical framework of this paper can apply, however, to the more general situation where 
each country has more than one policy tool.  I consider in this part the case where each country 
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has two policy tools: tariff (trade policy) and production tax (domestic policy). 
The theoretical framework in the case of two policy tools is similar to that in the 
previous part.  One critical difference is that there is a wedge between consumer and producer 
prices because of the introduction of a vector of specific production taxes ( )Nttt ,...,1= .  The 
producer price of good i is thus equal to iiiwis tpp −+= τ , while the consumer price is 
iiwic pp τ+= .  The output of good i is redefined as ( ) isiisi pRpY ∂∂= , the total externalities 
to the country Z  is expressed as ( ) ( )( )[∑
=
≡
N
i
iiiiisiid ttpYttZ
1
**** ,,,,,, ττηττ  
( )( )]**** ,,, iiiiisiic ttpY ττη+ , net import demand is ( ) ( ) ( )isiiciisici pYpDppM −=, , and the world 
equilibrium price which satisfies the market-clearing condition is given by ( )** ,,, iiiiiw ttp ττ . 
Domestic welfare is then rewritten in the same form as Conconi (2003). 
(27) ( )** ,,, ttW ττ ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑∑
===
+++≡
N
i
iiiiii
N
i
iiiiii
N
i
iiiii ttYtttMttRL
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**
1
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. 
Objective functions of RPs and donation schedules of SIGs are extended so as to incorporate t  
and *t  in the same manner as τ  and *τ .16 
When the RP sets its tariff and production tax unilaterally to maximize its domestic 
welfare, taking the tariff of the other country as given, the resulting reaction functions of tariff 
and production tax on good i are defined by, respectively, ( ) ( )***** MiiYiicMiii mHp εεηετ −=  
and idi Ht η= .  In this case, iτ  is determined from the terms of trade effect: ** Miip ε  is the 
direct welfare effect of the change of the terms of trade by iτ , while  
*** M
ii
Y
iic mH εεη−  is the 
indirect welfare effect through the change of negative externality from the production of the 
other country, which is caused by the change of the terms of trade.  it  is, on the other hand, 
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set from the level of negative externality from the home production: idi Ht η=  is a 
nondistortionary production tax to counter the local direct externality.  Note that it  is 
independent of iτ , 
*
iτ , and 
*
it , while iτ  and 
*
iτ  are interdependent. 
In the case of multilateral lobbying, the schedule of donations from j-SIG in the home 
country is slightly rewritten from Equation (15a) to ( ) ( ) =+ ** ,, tCtC jCDj ττ  
( ) jj WttW −** ,,, ττ .  In a truthful equilibrium of contract offers, the conditions jtDjt ii WC =  
and jt
jC
t ii
WC ** =  are satisfied, in addition to Equation (17a), for j-SIG.  When ( )*,ωω ( )1,1= , 
the equilibrium tariffs and production taxes are derived as 0* =− ii ττ  and 
( )( )iicidiYi mHHt **ηηε −− ( )( ) 0***** =−−− iidiciYi mHHt ηηε , respectively.  The former 
condition is the same as that in Section 6, while the latter condition requires total production 
tax revenue of the world to be equal to total welfare loss of the world from negative externalities 
of productions. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper examines the effects of lobbying activities across borders on determining 
trade policies in a multi-principal, multi-agent, and menu-auction model.  The main result is 
that multilateral lobbying, i.e., the situation in which both domestic and cross-border lobbying 
activities are permitted, brings the equilibrium of tariffs in countries towards the 
Pareto-efficiency locus, on the assumption that all the individuals belong to one of the domestic 
SIGs.  When each RP evaluates political contributions from national SIGs and from abroad 
with the same weight, a Pareto-efficiency is attained at which the unweighted sum of the two 
countries’ welfare is maximized.  In other words, in order to maximize world welfare, each 
government should allow every party the right to raise political funds from abroad, and each 
party should treat all the contributions equally, regardless of the nation of origin. 
This result reestablishes the theoretical findings of Becker (1983) and Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) about the relationship of lobbying and efficient policies.  Becker (1983) 
presented the proposition that competition among pressure groups favors efficient methods of 
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domestic taxation in a country, and Grossman and Helpman (1994) stated that in a small 
economy free trade prevails when all voters belong to one of the interest groups.  My analysis 
extends these statements, and proposes that efficient policies are successfully adopted even in 
the case of large countries, if RPs treat domestic and cross-border donations equally.  This 
would not assure, however, that the new equilibrium of the Pareto-efficient tariffs is beneficial 
for all countries.  To convert efficiently the potential benefit of multilateral lobbying into an 
actual benefit for each country, an effective and powerful international scheme for income 
transfer is essential. 
 Readers may doubt some of the assumptions in the model, especially those about 
principals (SIGs), agents (RPs), and an outcome (truthful equilibrium) of a menu-auction.  
First, as for SIGs, an extreme assumption is that every individual can express his or her 
preference to both home and foreign RPs through the SIG to which it belongs.  Reflecting on 
the behavior of actual SIGs, it is natural to consider the existence of some political costs of 
forming and maintaining SIGs, which result in some individuals choosing not to participate in 
lobbying activities.  Mitra (1999) introduces this political cost and analyzes endogenous lobby 
formation.  My assumption corresponds to Mitra’s model when every individual participates in 
a SIG and costs of lobbying are sufficiently low.  I have to admit, however, that collecting 
information on the tax policies of all countries and making out their schedules of donation could 
be laborious work for all SIGs.  Second, as for RPs, the total amount of donations each RP 
collects becomes excessively large when all SIGs follow truthful transfers, since each RP has a 
monopolistic power in the legislative branch of government.  This kind of fund-collecting 
behavior by political parties is unacceptable to citizens.  And third, the practicability of 
truthful transfers might be suspect.  Kirchsteiger and Prat (2001) run an experiment and find 
that the truthful alternative is chosen in only a fraction of all matches.  This undermines our 
discussion, since truthful equilibrium is a crucial characteristic of all the propositions presented 
in the text. 
 Despite these caveats, the main message of this analysis still holds.  That is, foreign 
political contributions per se are not harmful in the world.  Rather, they help every 
government to be aware of foreign concern for its economic policy, and to become more sensitive 
to the impact of its policy on world welfare.  Binding contracts of cross-border political 
contributions with overseas RPs are efficient tools by which SIGs can reveal their interests in 
the economic policies of foreign countries.  In this sense, free international lobbying serves well 
as a catalyst for creating a more cooperative and efficient world economy.  Some may think 
that cross-border donations become threats against nations, sovereignty and their right to 
political self-determination.  With the rise of multinational corporations and the increase in 
foreign trade and investment, foreign people seek to influence the domestic policies of the 
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nations in which they do business.  This growing foreign political influence has caused elected 
officials of many countries to fear that their nations’ political and economic independence is at 
risk.  Seen from a different point of view, these domestic concerns are an indication that 
governments need to take into account the impact of their legislation on the welfare of other 
countries.  Based on the model in this paper, such awareness can be considered an important 
component in future meaningful international cooperation. 
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Table 1: Number of countries which ban foreign donations: 
 by income and region    
     
Is there a full ban on foreign donations to political parties? 
     
  Yes No  
Total:  40 71  
GDP (million US$, 2003):    
 100,000 plus 14 15  
 10,000 - 99,999 13 13  
 1,000 - 9,999 11 25  
 up to 999 2 18  
Per capita GDP (US$, 2003):    
 10,000 plus 11 17  
 3,000 - 9,999 10 19  
 1,000 - 2,999 10 15  
 up to 999 9 20  
Region:    
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 Africa 4 19  
 The Americas 12 20  
 Asia 6 4  
 Europe 17 17  
 Oceania 1 11  
     
Source: Austin and Tjernström (2003), World Bank (2004) 
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Appendix: First-Order Conditions in Section 6.2. 
 
 First-order conditions for maximizing Equation (27) with respect to iτ , it , 
*
iτ , and 
*
it  are, respectively, 
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where iiwi tp ∂∂=δ , ** iiwi tp ∂∂=δ , 10 << iδ , and 10 * << iδ .  Reaction functions of tariff 
and production tax on good i, ( ) ( )***** MiiYiicMiii mHp εεηετ −=  and idi Ht η= , are acquired 
from Equations (A.1), (A.2), and the market-clearing condition, assuming ii δφ ≠ . 
When ( )*,ωω ( )1,1= , the equilibrium tariffs and production taxes which maximize 
world welfare satisfy the following conditions. 
(A.5) 0* =+
ii
WW ττ , 
(A.6) 0* =+
ii tt
WW , 
(A.7) 0*** =+
ii
WW
ττ
, 
(A.8) 0*** =+
ii tt
WW . 
One way of calculating the equilibrium tariffs and production taxes is as follows: from 
Equations (A.5) and (A.7), ++ *
ii
WW ττ 0
*
** =+
ii
WW
ττ
, assuming 1* ≠+ ii φφ .  Also, from 
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Equations (A.6) and (A.8), ++ *
ii tt
WW 0*** =+
ii tt
WW , assuming 1* ≠+ ii δδ .  From these two 
equations, we acquire 0* =− ii ττ  and ( )( )iicidiYi mHHt **ηηε −−  
( )( ) 0***** =−−− iidiciYi mHHt ηηε .   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
1 The positive and negative opinions for political donation from abroad in the context of the U.K. 
are well summarized in the report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (Committee on 
Standards in Public Life, the U.K., 1998), presented to the Parliament in 1998 as background 
material to discuss the regulations of political funding.  In this document, the arguments 
against the imposition of a ban on foreign donations are categorized into six points as follows 
(Volume 1, pp. 65-68).  (1) There are a number of political parties within the U.K. which rely on 
and value contributions from those living overseas.  (2) There is nothing intrinsically wrong 
with an overseas donation, provided that it does not come from a foreign government.  (3) The 
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impact of foreign donations has been exaggerated.  (4) It is difficult to stipulate a satisfactory 
definition of the persons and corporations which must be treated as foreign, for the purpose of a 
legislative ban on foreign donations.  (5) Concerning the upsurge of requirements for 
transparency and disclosure of political funding, this is not the time to introduce a further 
legislative restriction on the ability of political parties to secure adequate funding.  (6) Two 
special cases: the treatment of some territories which come under the sovereignty of the U.K. 
and of future cross-border parties in Europe.  This document presents, as well, the arguments 
in favor of a ban including the following four points: (1) Since political parties are involved in 
the domestic process taking place within the U.K., political parties should be confined to 
seeking financial support from those entitled to vote for them.  (2) Disclosure is not enough.  
(3) Such difficulties as there may be with the legislative definition of a ban must be tackled, and 
the best solution possible produced.  (4) Allowing donations from dependent territories would 
potentially open up a substantial loophole in the prohibition of foreign donations. 
2 The first U.S. law banning foreign contributions to political campaigns was enacted in 1966.  
The amended Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) declared it a felony for a foreign 
principal to use an agent to contribute to domestic election campaigns or for a candidate to 
accept or solicit such contributions. The language of this prohibition, however, still permitted 
foreign nationals to provide funds directly to candidates.  After this loophole was widely 
recognized through the Watergate hearings, Congress revised the Federal Election Campaign 
Act to prohibit contributions from any foreign national in 1974.  Despite this revision, foreign 
money can still enter U.S. campaign treasuries through U.S. subsidiaries of foreign 
corporations.  In general, U.S. law prohibits direct contributions from corporations to federal 
political campaigns, but U.S. corporations may establish political action committees (PACs), 
which have the right to make limited campaign contributions.  Thus, a U.S.-incorporated, 
foreign-owned company’s PACs could serve as a conduit for foreign funds to U.S. electoral 
campaigns, provided that they are registered with the Justice Department in accordance with 
the FARA (Damrosch, 1989; Powell, 1996).  The definition of “foreign agent” in Gawande, 
Krishna, and Robbins (2004) and Kee, Olarreaga, and Silva (2004) refers to this type of PAC.  
Note that both papers use the gross amount of money for agents’ activities in the U.S. as a 
variable for the extent of their presence in the U.S. political arena.  In contrast, the amount of 
political donations to politicians has a key role in my research. 
3 The home and the foreign countries have similar economic structures, so I don’t refer to 
conditions for the foreign country explicitly in Sections 2, 3, and 6 in the text. 
4 When the country is a net importer of good i, 0>iτ  and 0<iτ  mean an import tax and an 
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import subsidy, respectively.  When the country is a net exporter of good i, 0>iτ  and 0<iτ  
denote an export subsidy and an export tax, respectively. 
5 This model setting doesn’t deal with the external effect.  Externality does not change the 
results of this paper if welfare functions preserve concavity concerning τ  and *τ .  See 
Section 6, for an example. 
6 NG  is the function of τ , with *τ  as given; the RP of the home country uses τ  as a policy 
instrument, but it cannot manipulate a foreign country’s policy instrument *τ  directly. 
7 In the case of a small country, this assumption brings the result that free trade prevails in all 
sectors, as shown in Grossman and Helpman (1994), because the various SIGs neutralize one 
another.  In the setting of this model, however, the results turn out to be different. 
8 I focus on equilibrium where all SIGs make a positive amount of political contributions to the 
RP. 
9 It is assumed that the rise in the tariff on good i ( iτ ) increases its local price ( ip ) even though 
it also leads to the rise in the other country’s tariff ( *iτ ), which in turn decreases the home 
country’s price of good i ( ip ).  It is expressed as ( ) ( )( ) ***0 Riiiiii ddpp ττττ ∂∂+∂∂< , or 
( ) iRiii dd φττφ −< 1*** . 
10  The condition ii φπ −< 1  comes from the condition mentioned in footnote 8: 
( ) iRiiii dd φττφπ −<≤ 1*** , since 10 ≤< ϕ . 
11 The model of multilateral lobbying presented in the text has enough applicability for the case 
of international SIGs.  The role of international SIGs, organized by some SIGs in different 
countries, on the determination of trade policies was originally examined by Conconi (2003).  
In the context of my model, when some home and foreign SIGs form an international coalition 
and aim at maximizing an unweighted sum of their welfare by giving political contributions to 
both the home and foreign countries, the international SIG designs its donation to home and 
foreign RPs considering only the direct effect of home and foreign tariffs on its aggregate 
welfare, respectively.  Again, strategic relationships between trade policies of the two countries 
disappear.  Therefore, incorporating international SIGs into my model does not change the 
main argument in the text. 
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12 Though mechanism design of international income redistribution is an important problem, it 
is outside of the scope of this paper. 
13 It is possible for total externalities to have a more general form concerning the output of 
goods, as long as strong concavity of utility functions is preserved.  If the reader interprets 
negative externalities as environmental pollution, it might be natural to consider that total 
externalities are the function of accumulated pollutants produced from past economic activities.  
The accumulation of externalities, however, is beyond the comparative static analysis. 
14 When the country is an importer of good 1, this term means that the country has an 
incentive to decrease its import tariff so as to decrease the domestic price of good 1 and then 
reduce its domestic production.  When the country is an exporter of good 1, on the other hand, 
this term shows the incentive to elevate its export tariff. 
15 It is assumed that 1* ≠+ ii φφ  in order to avoid the indetermination of equilibrium tariffs. 
16 The derivation of first-order conditions in this part can be found in the Appendix. 
